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Tait: Uber Everywhere; but Where Is the Driver's Destination in New Yor

NOTES
UBER EVERYWHERE; 1

BUT WHERE IS THE DRIVER'S DESTINATION IN NEW YORK?

I. INTRODUCTION

Uber Technologies Inc. ("Uber") was founded in 2009 and
arrived in New York City ("NYC") in 2011. 2 Uber created a
smartphone app, called Uber ("Uber app"), where passengers create an account, enter a payment method (usually a credit card), and
then type in their destination.3 After a few taps on the phone
screen, an Uber driver will be en route to the passenger's current
location to pick up the passenger and ultimately bring them to
their desired stop. 4 After the trip is finished, Uber charges the passenger directly from the Uber app, meaning passengers no longer
have to worry about carrying cash.
Within five years, Uber attracted nearly 46,000 vehicles
and completes over 222,000 daily trips around NYC. 6 Uber
1MADEINTYO, Uber Everywhere, on You ARE FORGIVEN (Privateclub
Records 2016) (explicit content warning).
2How Uber Works: Insights into the Business & Revenue Model,
https://jungleworks.com/uber-business-model-revenue-insights/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2019).
3 A guidefor how to use Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/howuber-works/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2019).
4
JUNGLEWORKS,

id.

5

1d.

6 Winnie

Hu, Yellow Cab, Long a Fixture of City Life, Is for Many a
Thing of the Past,N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 15, 2017,
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claims that "[n]early 90 percent of drivers say the main reason
they use Uber is because they love being their own boss." 7 Uber,
and its competitor Lyft, state, "that their platforms are designed to

provide drivers with extra income on top of their existing salaries
from other work."8 With an ever-growing demand for Uber's services in one of the busiest cities in the world, it seems drivers have
ample opportunity to make "extra income on top of their existing
salaries."
But looks can be deceiving. Across the United States, and
internationally,1 0 legal battles between Uber and drivers rage on in
courtrooms. 1 The issue at the crux of these cases is whether the
drivers are "employees" to whom Uber owes benefits, or "inde-

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/nyregion/yellow-cab-long-a-fixture-ofcity-life-is-for-many-a-thing-of-thepast.html?hp&action=click&pgtype-Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=second-column-region&region--top-news&WT.nav-topnews& r=O.
7-Matthew Hamilton, Laborprotections rise in New York's Uber, Lyft debate, TIMESUNION (Jan. 7, 2017, 9:46 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/tupluslocal/article/Labor-protections-rise-in-New-York-s-Uber-Lyft- 10842682.php.
8Id.
9 Hamilton, supra note 7; Hu, supra note 6; New York City is the ThirdMost Gridlocked City in the World, Study Finds,NBC N.Y. (Feb. 21, 2017,
11:53 AM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Congested-Road-NewYork-Cross-Bronx-Traffic-INRIX-Study-414367723 .html.
10 Julia Kollewe and Gwyn Topham, Uber apologises after London ban
and admits 'we got things wrong', THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2017, 9:11 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/25/uber-tfl-concems-vowskeep-operating-london-licence.
11See Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2017);
McGillis v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017); O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal.
2016); In re New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, A.L.J. Case
No. 016-23858 (June 9, 2017),
http://www.almcms.com/contrib/content/uploads/sites/292/2017/06/ALJDecision-Redacted.pdf [hereinafter The Unemployment Insurance Case]; Greg
Bensinger, Uber, Lyft Face Setback in Push to Block Seattle Union Effort,
WALL ST. J., (Aug. 1, 2017, 9:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-lyftface-setback-in-push-to-block-seattle-union-effort- 1501638628.
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pendent contractors" to whom it does not. 12 Uber currently classifies its drivers as "independent contractors. 13 The focus of this
Note will be on one particular New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board decision, In re New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, A.L.J. Case No. 016-23858 ("The Unemployment Insurance Case"), 14 that affirmed a New York State DeDepartment of Labor determination, which held that three drivers,
AK, JH and JS, who were "deactivated" ("Uber-speak" for being
fired or suspended) by Uber were entitled to unemployment benefits. 15 Administrative Law Judge ("A.L.J.") Michelle Burrowes
determined, and the Appeal Board affirmed, 16 that the three claimants, along with "all others similarly situated to claimants to be
employees of the employer, [Uber]."' 7 Seemingly, these "other[]
similarly situated" drivers would have to be deactivated by Uber in
order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. Uber "plans to
'8
appeal the decision."'

See cases cited supra note 11.
13The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11; Hamilton,
supra
note 7; see Technology Services Agreement, UBER §§ 2.4, 13.1 (Dec. 11, 2015),
[hereinafter Tech. Services Agreement] https://s3.amazonaws.com/uberregulatorydocuments/country/united-states/RASIER%2OTechnology%2OServices%2OAgreem
ent%20Decmeber/2010%202015.pdf (Raiser is a subsidiary of Uber); see U.S.
Terms of Use, UBER (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/
[hereinafter Uber Terms of Use].
14 The Unemployment Insurance Case,
supra note 11.
15 The Unemployment Insurance Case,
supra note 11.
16
In re New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, A.L.J. Case
No. 016-23494 (July 12, 2018),
http://www.nyctaxinews.com/Uber/o20AB%2ODecision-redacted.pdf [hereinafter The Board Decision].
17
1d. at 19.
18 Matthew Hamilton, Judge Finds NYC Uber Drivers
to be Employees;
Upstate Impact Debated, TIMESUNION (June 14, 2017, 4:34 PM),
http://www.timesunion.com/allwcniarticle/Judge-finds-NYC-Uber-drivers-tobe-employees-1 1220139.php; Alison Griswold, New York statejust dealt another blow to Uber's business model, QUARTZ (June 13, 2017),
12

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

3

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:2

The Unemployment Insurance Case arose from an appeal
by Uber.19
of a New York Department of Labor ("DOL") decision
The DOL and A.L.J. Michelle Burrowes determined that the driver-claimants "and all others similarly situated ...

to be employ-

20
Uber apees" of Uber for unemployment benefits purposes.
pealed A.L.J. Burrowes' decision to uphold the DOL's
determination to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the
"Board"), which affirmed the A.L.J.'s decision. 1
Pursuant to N.Y. Labor Law § 102, the Board's decision is
deemed "final.",22 However, Uber can appeal the Board's decision
in an Article 78 hearing. 23 The New York State Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court hearing Uber's Article 78 appeal
will be tasked with determining if the Board's decision, and thus
the A.L.J.'s and DOL's determination, was "supported by substanThis Note will
tial evidence" found within the "entire record."
Insurance
Unemployment
the
of
facts
provide an analysis of the
Case with the applicable law in order to determine how a New
York State court would likely resolve this classic labor and employment issue arising out of a wholly 21st century employment
relationship.
Uber is faced with three options in this appeal: (1) lose in a
New York State court and have all drivers "similarly situated" to
the three "deactivated" drivers, within the court's jurisdiction, be
reclassified as "employees" who are entitled to unemployment

https://qz.com/1005254/three-uber-drivers-were-ruled-employees-forunemployment-purposes-by-new-york-state/.
19 The Unemployment Insurance Case supra note 11, at 3.
20 The Unemployment Insurance Case supra note 11.
21 The Board Decision supra note 16. Uber appealed the A.L.J.'s decision
in The Unemployment Insurance Case to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board on June 29, 2017, and had its motion to withdraw the appeal denied on
July 12, 2018. Id. Uber was deemed liable for the A.L.J.'s decision in The UnInsurance Case. Id.
employment
22
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 102 (McKinney 2019).
23 N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 2019).
2
4 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 7803(4) (McKinney 2019); N.Y. LAB. LAW §
7804(g) (McKinney 2019) (explaining when a "substantial evidence" issue is
raised, the appellate division "shall dispose of all issues in the proceeding").
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benefits; 25 (2) win the case in the New York State court and continue the status quo with precedential ammunition to defeat further
employee benefits cases, 26 like courts have done in McGillis v.
Department of Economic Opportunity2 7 and Saleem v. Corporate
TransportationGroup Ltd.; or (3) attempt a settlement with the
drivers, 29 like Uber attempted and failed in O'Connor v. Uber
Technologies Inc.,30 31
and where it successful settled in Price v. Uber Technologies Inc.
This Note will analyze the relevant New York State laws
and apply the facts of the Unemployment Appeal Board's decision
in an attempt to predict the outcome of a potential appeal in a New
York State court. This will include a comparison of the cases cit25 See infra Part V.A.
26 See infra Part V.B.

27 McGillis v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 226 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2017); see infra Part V.B.1.
28 Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2017); see
infra Part V.B.3.
29 See infra Part VI.
30 See O'Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal.
2016) (rejecting the proposed settlement for being unfair to the drivers); see infra Part VI.A. On March 12, 2019, Uber "agreed to pay $20 million to settle the
[O'Connor] class-action lawsuit," but it is pending judicial approval. Megan
Rose Dickey, Uber agrees to pay drivers $20 million to settle independentcontractorlawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/12/uber-agrees-to-pay-drivers-20-million-tosettle-independent-contractor-lawsuit/; Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber settles driver
classificationlawsuitfor $20 million, THE VERGE (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/12/18261755/uber-driver-classificationlawsuit-settlement-20-million.
31Price v. Uber Techs. Inc., Case No. BC554512 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los Angeles Cty 2015); see infra Part VI.B.; Alexander M. Tait, The Gang Settles A
Labor ClassificationSuit: The Price-UberSettlement Has FinallyBeen Approved, THE LELJER (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://thelejer.wordpress.com/2018/01/25/the-gang-settles-a-laborclassification-suit-the-price-uber-settlement-has-fmally-been-approved/ (citing
Melissa Daniels, Calif Judge Oks $7. 75M Uber Drive Deal Over Objections,
LAw360 (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:25PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1002461/calif-judge-oks-7-75m-uber-driverdeal-over-objections).
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ed supra and the controlling precedents in the New York State
court.
II. THE WHO: GREATEST HITS OF WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE IN
NEW YORK STATE

New York State's laws are complex, contradictory, and
there seems to be a law for everything. 32 Because of this, the definition of "employee," and "employer," is hard to pin down.3 3 This
is problematic because the central issue of determining whether a
worker is entitled to benefits under New York State law is determining whether that worker is an "employee" or an "independent
contractor. '"34 This is why numerous relevant statutes and cases
that define these terms are provided infra. One thing to keep in
mind is that these definitions only apply to cases and controversies
that arise under the relevant statutes and no single definition applies in every context. Nonetheless, examining these definitions
will shed some light on what these terms mean in a courtroom located in New York State.
A. New York LaborLaw
The current definition found in the New York Labor Law
states that an "' [e]mployee' means a mechanic, workingman or laborer working for anotherfor hire."35 The New York Labor Law
See N.Y. LAW (McKinney 2019).
§ 511 (McKinney 2016); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 512
(McKinney 2000); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 651 (McKinney 2016); N.Y. LAB. LAW §
2010).
701 (McKinney
34
See N.Y. LAB. LAW §651 (McKinney 2016); N.Y. LAB. LAW§701
2010).
(McKinney
35
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 2(5) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added); see N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 2(14) (McKinney, 2011) (addressing the problematic phrase
"workingman" by stating "[a]ll references to male employees in this chapter
shall be deemed to include female employees"); see also Scott v. Scott's Landing, Inc., 715 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 2000) ("Plaintiff is both the owner of
the building where the accident occurred and the sole shareholder, officer, and
director of defendant corporation. Plaintiff therefore was not 'working for an32

33 See N.Y. LAB. LAW
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defines "[e]mployer" as "the person employing any such mechanic, workingman or laborer, whether the owner, proprietor, agent,
superintendent, foreman or other subordinate. 36
Finally,
"[e]mployed"
is
defined
as
being
"permitted
or
suffered
to
37
work."

B. The New York State Labor Relations Act
The New York State Labor Relations Act ("NYSLRA"),
New York 38
State's equivalent to the National Labor Relations Act

("NLRA"), provides detailed definitions of "employer" and

"employee" for workers involved with labor organizations and un40
39 Many Uber 39
ions.
drivers
belong to
The NYSLRA
defines
"employer"
as: one labor union or another.
[A]ny person acting on behalf of or in the interest
of an employer, directly or indirectly, with or without his knowledge, and shall include any person
who is the purchaser of services performed by a
person described in paragraph (b) of subdivision
three of this section, but a labor organization or any
officer or agent thereof shall only be considered an

other for hire' (Labor Law §2[5]) and did not come within the class of persons
protected
by the Labor Law.").
36
LAB. § 2(6).
SLAB. § 2(7).

38 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935).
39
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 701(2)-(3) (McKinney 2010).
40 Noam Scheiber, UberHas a Union of Sorts, but Faces Doubts of Its

Autonomy, N.Y. TIMEs (May 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/business/economy/uber-driversunion.html; N.Y. TAxI WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://www.nytwa.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2019). The New York Taxi Workers Alliance was a party to the
Unemployment Insurance case. The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note
11; We are Uber,Lyfi, Juno, Via workers unitedfor afair industry,
INDEPENDENT DRIVERS GUILD, https://drivingguild.org/ (last visited Mar. 20,
2019).
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employer with respect to individuals employed by
such organization. 4 1
The NYSLRA adopts much of the same language of the
NLRA when defining "employee. ' 4 2 The Court of Appeals de41
42

LAB. §701(2)
Compare N.Y. LAB. LAW § 701(3)(a) (McKinney 2010), with 29

U.S.C. § 152(3) (McKinney 1935).
The term "employees" includes but is not restricted to any individual employed by a labor organization; any individual
whose employment has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment; and shall not
be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless
the article explicitly states otherwise, but shall not include any
individual employed by his parent or spouse or in the domestic service of and directly employed, controlled and paid by
any person in his home, any individual whose primary responsibility is the care of a minor child or children and/or
someone who lives in the home of a person for the purpose of
serving as a companion to a sick, convalescing or elderly person or any individuals employed only for the duration of a labor dispute, or any individuals employed as farm laborers or,
any individual who participates in and receives rehabilitative
or therapeutic services in a charitable non-profit rehabilitation
facility or sheltered workshop or any individual employed in a
charitable non-profit rehabilitation facility or sheltered workshop who has received rehabilitative or therapeutic services
and whose capacity to perform the work for which he is engaged is substantially impaired by physical or mental deficiency or injury.
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 701(3)(a) (McKinney 2010).
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because
of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any
other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol36/iss2/5
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clared in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Board that despite the variations of the NLRA language
adopted by the New York State Legislature, the overall principle
governing both of the Acts were congruous: to allow employees to
organize and collectively bargain with employers.43 The main
contention of Metropolitan Life Insurance was that NYSLRA
omitted "the phrase 'any employee"' which is found in the
NLRA. 44 The Court determined that the omission of "any employee" from the NYSLRA did not change the overarching policy
implemented by the statute.45 Thus, the Court firmly declared that
white collar workers, typically not represented by labor organizations, 46 were protected by the NYSLRA.447 The decision in Metropolitan stands for the notion that the NYSLRA is at least as encompassing as the NLRA and covers the hard-to-define
"employees" that wish to collectively bargain.
C. New York State Minimum Wage Act
Additionally, the New York State Minimum Wage Act
provides its own definitions for these terms.48 The Act states,
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse,
or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor
Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person
who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (McKinney 1935).
43 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 280 N.Y.
194, 205-06 (1939).
44 Id. at 205.
45
1Id. at 205-06.
46
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 701(5) (McKinney 2002) ("'Labor organization'
means any organization which exists and is constituted for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of collective bargaining, or of dealing with employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or
and which is not a company union as defined herein.").
protection
47
MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 280 N.Y. at 205-06.
48 N.Y. LAB. LAW. § 651 (McKinney 2016).
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"'[e]mployee' includes any individual employed or permitted to
work by an employer in any occupation, but shall not include any
individual who is employed or permitted to work: ...

as a driver

engaged in operating a taxicab.' 49 "'Employer' includes any individual, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability
company, business trust, legal representative,
or any organized
50
employer.,
as
acting
persons
of
group
D. The Unemployment InsuranceLaw
The most relevant statute for this Note's purpose is the Unemployment Insurance Law ("UIL"). 5 ' Ironically, the UIL does
not expressly define "employee," rather the law defines "employment" instead. 52 The UIL provides a "general definition" of "employment" as "(a) any service under any contract for employment
for hire, express or implied, written or oral and (b) any service by
a person for an employer., 53 This is followed by twenty-three
subsections with further subsections therein.54 Further, the UIL
also defines kinds of work that is not "employment., 55 The "services" exempt from UIL protection are hyper-specific and do not
help determine whether a person is an "employee" unless the
worker fits within the exception.56
As shown, the New York State legislature has chosen time
and again to define "employee" as broadly and vaguely as possible. This has led to the courts developiig tests, as shown below, to
determine whether a person's employment relationship falls within
the scope of "employee" or an independent contractor.

4' LAB. § 651(5)(e) (emphasis added).
50
LAB. § 651(6).
51 N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 500-643 (McKinney 1944).
52
LAB. § 511.
53 id.
54id.

55
56

LAB. § 511(7), (8), (10), (12), (15), (17), (23).
id.
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III.

NINE-TO-FIvE

DEGREES

OF

SEPARATION

FROM

EMPLOYEE TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE DEGREE OF CONTROL TEST IN NEW YORK

A. Morton/Restatement220 Degree of Control Test
The dispositive issue here is that none of these statutes
have defined precisely what an "independent contractor" is. These
statutes only state what an employee is and, in a few instances, is
not.57 The New York Court of Appeals, the State's highest
court, 58 decided a seminal case in New York labor classification in
In re Morton.59 The court in Morton explained:
Employment, except where the context shows otherwise, means any employment under any contract
of hire, express or implied, written or oral, including all contracts entered into by helpers and assistants of employees, whether paid by employer or
employee, if employed with the knowledge actual
or constructive of the employer, in which all or the
greater part
of the work is to be performed within
60
state.
this
The Morton court also provided "'employee' means any
person, including aliens and minors, employed for hire by an employer in an employment subject to this article, except any person
whose6 1wages exceed three thousand dollars in any calendar
year."
57 See supra note 61.
58 COURT OF APPEALS, ST. OF N.Y.,

https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/

(last visited Mar. 20, 2019).
59
Inre Morton, 30 N.E.2d 369 (1940).
60
1Id.at 371.
61 Id. (citing N.Y. LAB. LAW § 502 (McKinney, 1995)). Morton was decided in 1940, explaining the $3,000 qualifier, but § 502 has since been amend-
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The court in Morton further provided the test for determining whether a person is an "employee" or an "independent contractor" "within the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance
Law" with a modified factor-based "Degree of Control" test based
on the Restatement (First) of Agency § 220. 62 Later cases have relied on Morton's test and have made further developments by re63
fining and reducing the § 220/ Morton Degree of Control factors.
The Morton court stated:
The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor has been said to be the difference between one who undertakes to achieve an

In re Morton, 30 N.E.2d 369, 369-71 (1940);
OF AGENCY § 220(a)-(i) (AM. LAW INST. 1933)
62

RESTATEMENT (FIRST)

(1)A servant is a person employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the other's
control or right to control. (2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the
following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not
the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in
the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of
the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the
skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the
employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the
length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the
method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business
of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they
are creating the relationship of master and servant.

Id.

See Bynog v. Cipriani Grp. Inc., 802 N.E.2d 1090 (2003); Lazo v.
Mak's Trading Co., 644 N.E.2d 1350 (1994); In re Villa Maria Inst. of Music,
426 N.E.2d 466 (1981); Nassau Chapter of the Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n v. Cty.
Of Nassau, 428 N.E.2d 838 (1981); Liberman v. Gallman, 364 N.E.2d 823
(1977); Rokicki v. 24 Hour Courier Serv., 744 N.Y.S.2d 41 (App. Div. 2002);
Engel v. Calgon Corp. 498 N.Y.S. 877 (App. Div. 1986) (Casey, J., dissenting).
63
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agreed result and to accept the directions of his employer as to the manner in which the result shall be
accomplished, and one who agrees to achieve a certain result but is not subject to the orders of the employer as to the means which are used.64
The court also stated:
From the nature of the problem, the degree of control which must be reserved by the employer in order to create the employer-employee relationship
cannot be stated in terms of mathematical precision,
and various aspects of the relationship may be considered
in arriving at the conclusion in a particular
65
case.
A more recent case, In re Watson, articulated this notion
more succinctly: "[t]he pertinent inquiry is whether the purported
employer retained control over the results produced or the means
used to produce' 66those results, with control over the latter being
more important.
The United States Supreme Court has also supported the §
220 factor-based test in its 1992 decision of Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company v. Darden.67 The Supreme Court stated that

64 In

(1886)).
65
66

re Morton, 30 N.E.2d at 371 (citing Hexamer v. Webb, 4 N.E. 755

Id. (emphasis added); see cases cited supranote 63.
re Watson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 676, 678 (App. Div. 2015), abrogatedby In

re Mitchum, 20 N.Y.S.3d 235 (App. Div. 2015).
67
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (citing Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989))
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's
right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities
and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the
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the § 220 "list[] [is] nonexhaustive criteria for identifying masterservant relationship[s],, 68 and that § 220 test "contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed
and weighed with no one factor being decisive." 69 While Darden
is a United States Supreme Court case, thus it is not binding on
New York State Courts interpreting New York State law, and
Darden pertained to an Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA") action, 7 0 it nonetheless supports the validity of
New York's Court of Appeals Degree of Control test articulated in
Bynog v. CiprianiGroup Inc.7 1
B. Let Bynogs be Bynogs: The Bynog Degree of Control
FactorTest
In 2003, the Court of Appeals of New York in Bynog articulated that the Degree of Control factor-based test is the standard
all New York courts must use when determining whether a worker
is an "employee" or an "independent contractor., 72 Bynog's Dein and has evolved from the factors
gree of Control test is rooted
73
contemplated by Morton.
Like the Darden / § 220 / Morton factor-based test, the
Bynog test attempts to determine a worker's labor classification by

right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent
of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to
work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring
and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party.
Id.

68

Id. at 324.

69

Id. (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).
Id. at 319; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

70

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1978).
71 Bynog v. Cipriani Grp., Inc., 802 N.E.2d 1090 (2003).
72
Id. at 1093.
73

Id.
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inquiring into "the degree of control exercised by the purported
employer over the results produced or the means used to achieve
the results. 74 Instead of the nine factors used in Darden and Morton, the Bynog test has whittled it down to five factors. 75 The factors of the Bynog test are: "whether the worker (1) worked at his
own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other employment, (3)
received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer's payroll and (5)
was on a fixed schedule. 76
By taking all of the statutory definitions of "employee"
found within New York State's laws and applying the Bynog test,
this Note will determine what the court will likely decide in Uber's appeal of the A.L.J.'s decision, which was affirmed by the
Board. Furthermore, this Note can also determine how the driverclaimants and "other similarly situated" drivers may be classified.
This Note argues that the New York State court hearing Uber's
appeal on this matter will find in favor of the driver-claimants
based on the Bynog test analysis, which is set forth below.
IV. THE BYNOG DEGREE OF CONTROL TEST APPLIED TO THE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CASE

The New York State court that will hear Uber's Article 78
hearing 77 will be constrained by In re Concourse Ophthalmology
Associates, P.C.'s ("Concourse Ophthalmology"):
Whether an employment relationship exists within
the meaning of the unemployment insurance law is
a question of fact, no one factor is determinative
and the determination of the appeal board, if sup74

Bynog, 802 N.E.2d at 1093 (emphasis added).
Compare Bynog, 802 N.E.2d at 1093, with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
AGENCY § 220(a)-(i) (AM. LAW INST. 1933).
76 Bynog, 802 N.E.2d at 1093; see Lazo v. Mak's Trading Co. 644 N.E.2d
1350, 1351 (1994) (applying the same factors in a torts context); see also Bhanti
v. Brookhaven Mem'l. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 687 N.Y.S.2d 667, 669 (App. Div.
1999) (using these factors to determine the employment status of physical therapist).
75

77 See supra part I.
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ported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, is beyond further judicial review even
though there is evidence in the record that would
have supported a contrary conclusion.78
A.L.J Burrowes determined driver-claimants are "employees" of Uber for unemployment benefits purposes, and this decision was affirmed by the Appeal Board. 79 Accordingly, Uber
bears the burden of showing that the A.L.J and the Appeal Board
80
made this determination without such "substantial evidence."
The facts presented in the A.L.J.'s decision will be subjected to the
Bynog test in order to determine whether the driver-claimants are
"employees" or "independent contractors", but the A.L.J.'s deciaccording to Consion is given the presumption of being correct
8 1
course Ophthalmology's standard of review.
A.

Whether the Worker Worked at His Own Convenience

Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "convenience" as
"freedom from discomfort." 82 According to Uber, "[n]early 90
percent of drivers say the main reason they use Uber is because
they love being their own boss." 83 This claim is supported by the
fact that drivers are free to choose "when, where and how long
they will work" while using the Uber App, 84 and that "Uber does
not impose a work schedule on the drivers." 85 Also, drivers do not

78

In re Concourse Ophthalmology Assocs. P.C., 456 N.E.2d 1201, 1201

(1983).
79 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 19; The Board

Decision, supra note 16.
80 Concourse Ophthalmology, 456 N.E.2d at 1201.
81 Id.
82

Definition of Convenience, MERRIAM

WEBSTER,

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/convenience, (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
83 Hamilton, supra note 8.
84 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 7; Hamilton, supra note 8.
85 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 7.
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have to request time off from Uber. 86 With all that being said, one
claimant's contract stated that the driver must accept ride requests
on the Uber App "at least once per month., 87 Additionally, drivers must sign a non-negotiable contract prior to being "eligib[le]"
to use the Uber App,' 88 which "designate[s] . . .[drivers] as independent contractors."
In order to drive a "shift" for Uber, drivers must log on to
the Uber App with a username provided by Uber. 89 While using
the Uber App, drivers receive a notification when a potential passenger requests a ride, 90 and the driver has the option to accept the
fare or to decline the fare. 91 If accepted, the driver is given directions to the location of the passenger and upon arrival must wait
ten minutes for the passenger to get into the vehicle.92 If the driver
leaves before ten minutes, "Uber considers them ineligible for any
wait charge." 93 However, if the passenger makes the driver wait
longer than ten minutes or cancels, Uber has "sole discretion" to
determine if the passenger will be charged a fee for remittance to
the driver. 94 That in and of itself is certainly discomforting to a
driver who is working for income, whether "extra" or not. Once
the passenger is in the driver's vehicle, the Uber App notifies the
driver of the passenger's destination for the first time and suggests
a route. 95 The passenger can suggest a different route than the
route suggested by Uber and96the driver is "expected" to follow the
passenger's suggested route.
Even though they cannot decide which route is best, drivers are nonetheless required to be experienced and knowledgeable
86 The

Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 7.

87 id.
88 Id. at 5;

Uber Terms of Use, supra note 13; Tech. Services Agreement,

supra note 13 at §§ 2.4, 13.1.
89 See The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 7.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92

Id.

93

Id.

94 id.

95
96

Id.

id.
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of the area, evidenced by the fact that Uber administers a "map
test" to ascertain the claimants "knowledge of New York City"
prior to their "approval" to drive for Uber. 97 Despite having the
knowledge and skill to determine the "best" route, i.e. quickest,
safest, avoid traffic, etc., Uber has handcuffed the drivers to its
App. 98 There is no freedom from control for drivers in performing
the functions of their service, let alone a "freedom from discomfort." For example, an NFL player requested a ride on Uber from
Chicago to Buffalo, a ride that lasted nine hours one way, presumably causing the driver to have an at least eighteen-hour round
trip. 99 While, this may be an extreme example, it nonetheless
demonstrates the lack of freedom Uber drivers actually have in determining how long they drive for Uber.
In addition, Uber's policy to "hide" pick-up and drop-off
locations has led to drivers becoming victims of crime.100 Being
able to pick and choose when one works is convenient, but the
"freedom from discomfort" ends when it can result in being a victim of crime due to Uber's policies.
Further diminishing the "convenience" to work wherever
and whenever, Uber offers drivers numerous promotions that
could lead to an increase of earnings for the driver.10 ' While that
sounds like a benefit to the drivers, this promotion system emphasizes driving when and where Uber decides. Promotions include
"surge pricing," where Uber "increase[s] fares in certain geo-

97

See The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 3.

98 See

id. at 7.

99 Michael Sheetz, NFL player spends $932 on Uber ridefrom Chicago
for voluntary practice,CNBC (June 7, 2017, 1:11 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/07/nfl-player-shareece-wright-spends-932-onuber-ride-to-reach-voluntary-practice.html.
100 Amanda Woods, This duo threatened,robbed Uber driver with bat:
cops, N.Y. POST (May 13, 2017, 6:51 PM), http://nypost.com/2017/05/13/thisduo-threatened-robbed-uber-driver-with-bat-cops/; Police: Uber driverpunched
and robbed, WGRZ (Aug. 18, 2017, 7:29 PM),
http://www.wgrz.com/news/crime/police-uber-driver-punched-androbbed/465404069.
101 Id. at 11.•
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graphic locations based on market demands, 1 °2 such as during
"[b]ad weather, rush hour, and special events" or when "unusually
large numbers of people . . . want to ride Uber all at the same

time.''1°3 In essence, Uber was and still is directing drivers to service certain areas at specific times and paying a premium to attract
drivers to those areas. One such promotion, accepted by claimant
JH, "promised he would earn $1,500.00 if he drove 1,500 hours in
specified areas." 10 4 Essentially, Uber promised one additional dollar per hour if the driver drove in the promotional areas. JH complied, but Uber did not. 10 5 Instead of JH earning the promoted
$1,500, he earned significantly less, leading to Uber paying JH
"the difference of $556.94" to "rectify" the "so-called" situa1 6
tion.

0

Furthermore, while drivers are using the Uber App, "Uber
has the capacity to collect and review data regarding the Drivers'
activities."1' 0 7 "Uber analyzes the Drivers' acceptance and cancellation . . .rates," 10 8 "how long the [drivers] were online on the

App on particular dates,, 10 9 and the driver's rating, which is based
on passenger's post-ride'review on a one-to-five scale. 110 Uber
has advised drivers that it "expected" a "ninety-percent" acceptance rate and to maintain at least a "4.7" star-rating.111 "Uber
deem[ed] star-ratings below 4.3 unacceptable."'1 12 Like the contract the drivers must sign, these expectations are non-negotiable.
They were "subject to change, exclusively by Uber." 113 Each
driver's ratings and rates are included in the weekly payment

102
103

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
How surgepricingworks, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/partner-

app/how-surge-works/.
104 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
105id.
106

Id.

107

Id. at 9.

108 Id.

'°9 Id.at 11
110

Id. at9.
11Id. at 9,17.
112 Id.
113

id. at 9.
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statement Uber provides its drivers, 114 as well as Uber's feedback
Two driver-claimants received a comment from
and comments.
Uber stating: "nice work, your driver rating was above average."'116
In addition to incentivizing drivers to work when and
where Uber wants, Uber also punishes drivers for not doing so.
Based on their acceptance and cancellation rates as well as their
1 17 For
star ratings, drivers can face disciplinary action from Uber.
example, if a driver's rating "falls below Uber's minimum acceptable rating, Uber notifies said Driver by e-mail or other
means, that their rating has caused concern and places them at risk
of deactivation."11 8 Uber maintains a "Driver Deactivation Policy" which provides that Uber "might deactivate access [to the Uber App] because of low Rider ratings, high cancellation rates,
[and] [sic] low acceptance rates." 119 Pursuant to the Policy, driver-claimant AK was deactivated by Uber for "twenty-four hours"
for "excessive cancellations.' 120 Additionally, Uber would "log[]
out," or lock out, "[d]rivers who failed to accept two consecutive
ride requests.''
A.L.J Burrowes determined that Uber's practices of incentivizing, punishing, and monitoring drivers was "steps to modify
the claimant's behavior, as typical in an employer-employee relationship.' 22
1. The Convenience of FedEx - How the NLRB Delivered
the News that FedEx Drivers were Employees
In FedEx Home Delivery, the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") found that FedEx "essentially directs [drivers']
114

115

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 9,11.
id.at9.

116 id.

117

118

The Unemployment Insurance Case,supra note 11, at 9.
Id.

119 Id.

2OId.at

9, 17.

121 Id.

122 Id.
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performance via the enforcement of rules and tracking mechanisms. ,,123 It is important to note that FedEx Home Delivery was
overturned by the D.C. Circuit in favor of a decision that found the
FedEx drivers to be "independent contractors". 124 This comparison only serves to illustrate how the NLRB determined the employment classification with a similar set of facts.
The NLRB found that "FedEx conducts periodic audits and
appraisals of driver performance, and has the ability to track all
major work activities ... in real-time." 125 The "tracking" in FedEx is similar to Uber's monitoring of drivers' acceptance and cancellation rates; the duration of time of their "shifts" on particular
days; and the drivers' ratings. 126 However, the Second Circuit in
Saleem, found "some monitoring and discipline.., does not alter"
127
the inquiry into employer control.
The NLRB held that "FedEx may also impose disciplinary
measures including suspension or termination if drivers fail to
comply with contractual rules and procedures. 128 Uber employed
a similar discipline policy, where drivers were subject to "deactivation" (the term is used interchangeably for suspensions and terminations at Uber), for failing to maintain the Uber-proscribed
"ninety percent" acceptance rate, for declining consecutive requests, or for having a low driver rating.129 The NLRB concluded
that these factors "weigh in favor of employee status" under the
Darden test and thus the FedEx drivers at issue were "statutory
employees."' 130 While the NLRB's decision was vacated in favor
FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610, 622 (2014), vacated, 849
F.3d 1123 (2017).
124 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 622 (explaining this swing of
123

the classification exemplifies how reasonable minds can differ on employment
classification when presented with the same facts).
125 Id.

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 9-11.
Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 149 (2d Cir. 2017).
128FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 622, vacated,
849 F.3d 1123
(2017).
129 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 9.
130 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610 (2014), vacated, 849 F.3d
126
127

1123 (2017).
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of a decision by the D.C. Circuit that found the FedEx drivers to
be independent contractors and is not binding on New York State
courts, nonetheless the comparison can be persuasive for this factor.
Applying the-facts of the Unemployment Insurance Case to
the first prong of the Bynog test, a New York State court would
most likely weigh this factor in favor of employee classification
for the drivers. The determinative factor would be Uber's degree
of control over the driver-claimants' behavior, namely the incentive program that directs drivers to where and when Uber wants
drivers, the monitoring of the driver's reviews, and the rejecting of
ride requests, which can result in its drivers' suspension or termination. This amount of supervision could be deemed as controlling. With the analysis supplied by the NLRB in FedEx and the
undisputed fact that Uber fails to provide drivers with notice of the
requested destination before they can accept the fare, it is apparent
that drivers can be inconvenienced by the work Uber provides.
Again, because FedEx is not binding, along with the undisputed
fact that drivers can use the app whenever it is convenient, a court
could favor independent contractor status for this prong. However, the other facts surrounding the use of the Uber App show that
Uber maintains a degree of control over the means to the end
product, which is indicative of a master-servant relationship.
Thus, this factor most likely will weigh in favor of employee status.
B. Whether the Worker was Free to Engage in Other
Employment
This factor heavily favors Uber's claim that drivers are
"independent contractors." Uber, and its competitor Lyft, state
"that their platforms are designed to provide drivers with extra income on top of their existing salaries from other work." 131 "Uber
[was] aware and [did] not prohibit" drivers from working for its
competitors. 132 In the instant case, two claimants "also accepted

131
132

Hamilton, supra note 7.
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 13.
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ride requests from Uber's competitors while simultaneously using
the Uber App. 133 Under the terms of Uber's standard contract,
drivers "retain the complete right to; (i) use other software application services in addition to the Uber Services; and (ii) engage in
any other occupation or business."'' 34 While these facts are undisputed in the instant case, A.L.J. Michelle Burrowes found them to
be "not necessarily dispositive. ' ' 135 Even if this factor is "not necessarily dispositive," it still weighs in favor of an independent contractor classification because Uber does not have a restrictive covenant that controls drivers other employment opportunities.
C. Whether the Worker Received FringeBenefits
1. Uber Does Not Provide FringeBenefits
On its face, this prong most likely favors independent contractor classification for the driver-claimants, but it is entirely rebuttable based on the facts. It is undisputed that Uber does not
provide drivers with fringe benefits.1 36 Uber did not provide the
driver-claimants with "paid vacation, sick leave, health insurance
coverage or other fringe benefits."'1 37 Pursuant to Uber contracts,
drivers must maintain "workers compensation insurance as required by all applicable laws in the Territory."' 3 8 In New York
State, one such "workers compensation insurance" that exists for
"for-hire drivers" is the Black Car Fund Insurance-Workers'
Compensation Insurance.1 39 Uber complied with this regulation
through one of its twenty-eight black-car-base subsidiaries in New
York City, namely Unter LLC., which the driver-claimants were

133
134
135
136

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 13.
Tech. Services Agreement, supra note 13, at §§ 2.4, 13.1.
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 19.
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5.

137 id.
138
139

Tech. Services Agreement, supra note 13, at § 8.2.
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5; see 35

RCNY § 59B-03(d); see N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 160-dd, 160-ff (McKinney 1999).
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affiliated with. 140 "Unter withheld a small amount of each fare,"
and "[t]he withheld fares were submitted to New York State on a
monthly basis . . . on behalf of the claimants for their Black Car
Fund insurance., 141 The only control Uber exercised over the
driver-claimants' benefits is the remittance of the required money
for the Black Car Fund. 142 Drivers providing their own insurance
was, inter alia, a determinative factor in Castro-Quesadav. Tuawas an
panta, a case determining that the black car driver-claimant
143
test.
Bynog
the
using
contractor"
"independent
2.

Uber ProvidedPerks to the Driver-Claimants

However, the driver-claimants received perks from their
employment with Uber, such as the opportunity to lease vehicles,
open credit cards for fuel, and purchase a smart phone. Uber requires all drivers to have a vehicle and a smart phone in order to
use its App. 144 Driver-claimants "assumed the cost of their leased
or owned vehicles, fuel[,] (sic) insurance and maintenance
cost. ' 14 5 Further, drivers must operate a vehicle that is on Uber's
list of acceptable vehicles for each of its services: "Uber X (the
most basic acceptable vehicles); Uber XL; and, Uber Black (luxury vehicles)., 146 Two driver-claimants had "poor credit," so Uber
provided them with an affiliated third-party lender so the driver47
claimants could "lease vehicles despite their poor credit."'
However, Uber did not require the driver-claimants to use this

140

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5; Find-A-Ride:

A listing of TLC Licensed Bases by Borough and by Zip Code, N.Y.C. TAXI &
LIMouSINE COMMISSION (Oct. 3, 2017),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/fmd-aride.pdf.
141 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5.
142
143

144

See id.
Castro-Quesada v. Tuapanta, 49 N.Y.S.3d 757, 759 (App. Div. 2017).
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5.

145 id.

146 Id.; see

Uber CarRequirements, ALvIA (Jan. 12, 2017),

http://www.alvia.com/uber-new-york-car-requirements-for-uberx-xl/.
147 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5.
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leasing company. 148 Once the two driver-claimants leased vehicles from the Uber-affiliated third party, the driver-claimants "executed a Consent and Deduction Waiver, thereby, authorizing Uber to deduct and forward lease payments, from their fares ... to
the third-party lessor., 149 When one driver-claimant JS "became

delinquent in his payments" and quit driving for Uber, Uber
stepped in and negotiated on the driver's behalf with the lessor
"for an alternative payment schedule ...

which incentivized [the

driver] to resume providing ride service under Uber's App. 15 °
Another perk offered by an Uber affiliated third-party was
a "Fuel Card Program," that provided drivers with "credit cards to
purchase fuel."a5 Like the leasing agreement, Uber would withhold fares and forward the money to the creditor on behalf of the
driver. 152 Uber also provided the driver-claimants with the perk of
cell phones and accessories. 153 Driver-claimant AK did not own a
smart phone that could run the Uber App so Uber provided him
154
with a compatible smart phone and withheld fares to pay for it.
"Uber also
provided JH with a phone charger and cable, at no
5
cost."

15

While Uber does not provide its drivers with healthcare or
banked time, Uber did provide drivers with poor credit opportunities for loans, lines of credit and it also stepped in to negotiate the
terms of a lease for a driver-claimant. 156 In a Darden/§ 220 Degree of Control test, these facts would be applied to "the source of
the instrumentalities and tools" factor because Uber certainly provided them. 157 This factor is absent from the Bynog test, but as
one of Morten's progeny, the § 220 factors may be considered by
the New York State court. The state court could find that Uber did
148
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5.
149 Id. at 5-7.
150 Id. at7.
151Id.
152 id.

153Id.
154 id.

155Id.
156

Id. at5.

157 Nationwide Mut. ns. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992).
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control the driver-claimants' access to the 'tools of the trade' by
providing access to loans for the needed vehicles and providing
the needed smartphones and accessories for the driver-claimants in
order to use the Uber App.
Unfortunately, the court in the 2017 Appellate Division,
Second Department case of Wienfeld v. HR Photography, Inc.,
stated that "incidental control over the results produced without
further indicia of control over the means employed to achieve the
results will not constitute substantial evidence of an employeremployee relationship. 158 The state court would have to determine if these perks were "incidental control" in order for this factor to sway the driver-claimants' classification to that of "employee." Otherwise this factor would squarely land in the "independ"independent contractor" classification.
D. Whether the Worker was on the Employer's Payroll
Uber drivers are not a party to the monetary transaction
that pays for the rides they provide. 159 The Uber App "calculates
the fare based on current market factors."'' 60 The driver is "paid
on a per trip basis, ' 16 1 and Uber pays the driver weekly. 162 In the
weekly paycheck are all the fares the driver had completed that
163
week and any promotional reward the driver had received, minus Uber's non-negotiable fee of "twenty to thirty percent per
fare, 164 the Black Car Fund insurance payment,1 65 "deductions..
•for adverse Rider reports," and any withholdings Uber is authorized to take and remit to a lender. 166 Driver-claimant JS claimed

158

Wienfeld v. HR Photography, Inc., 52 N.Y.S.3d 458, 460 (App. Div.

2017) (quoting Raja v. Big Geyser, Inc., 42 N.Y.S.3d 288 (App. Div. 2016)).
159 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5.
160Id.

161

at 7.

Id. at 11.

162 id.
163

Id.

164 Id.

165Id.at

5; see 35 R.C.N.Y. § 59B-03(d) (providing injury compensation

for Black Car operators in New York).
166 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
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he made "$1,200 to $1,500 a week when he began driving '' 6 7 in
November 2015.168 By August 2016, when he stopped driving for
Uber, 169 JS claimed to make "below
the minimum wage despite
170
working 40-plus hours a week.,
Uber initially prohibited drivers from "solicitation, or acceptance of gratuities," 171 because Uber claimed, "the tip is already included" in the fare.' 72 But, since the events of this case,
Uber has implemented a tipping option in the Uber App. 173
The driver-claimants' wages were entirely dependent on
Uber. The drivers did not negotiate their rate to provide services
174
for Uber, nor did the drivers set the rate for each ride performed.
Uber unilaterally set its cut of the drivers' earnings and had the
sole discretion to change it. 175 Uber had the discretion to be able
to withhold funds for negative customer feedback and provided
drivers with little recourse in appealing the decision. 176 These
funds were presumably held in Uber's coffers or remitted back to
the passenger. 177 Uber also paid the drivers on a set schedule, so
the drivers did not have immediate access to the funds. 17 8 Finally,
Uber's policy to forbid tipping and the lack of a tipping function

167
168

Hamilton, supra note 7.
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 3 n. 1.

169 id.
170
171
172

Hamilton, supra note 7.
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 7.
Stephanie Rosenbloom, To Tip or Not to Tip Your Uber Driver,N.Y.

TIMEs (May 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/travel/uber-taxitipping.html?mcubz-1.
173 Can I tip my driver with the app?, UBER,
https://help.uber.com/h/8459a496-5ed2-4f9d-b 15c-d8afd9ccf34f (last visited
Oct. 3, 2017); Kari Paul, Uber allows tipping in 121 cities -here's how much
you should tip your driver, MARKETWATCH (July 8, 2017, 7:22 AM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-exactly-how-much-you-should-tipyour-uber-driver-2017-04-18.
174 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
175

Id.

176 id.

177//. at
178

11-13.

Id. at 11.
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of the app artificially limited the driver's potential earnings and
thereby increased their dependence on Uber for wages.
1. PayrollSimilarities between FedEx and Uber
While FedEx Home Delivery was overturned, the similarities of the payroll systems used by FedEx and Uber and the analysis provided by the NLRB serve as a helpful illustration on how
these factors are applied.
The driver-claimants were subject to a similar payroll
scheme as the employee-drivers in FedEx Home Delivery.179 Both
FedEx and Uber "unilaterally" determined the drivers rate of
pay. 180 The FedEx driver's weekly check was based on "the number of packages delivered, the number of stops made, the distance
traveled, and the number of days a driver's vehicle is available to
provide service."'1 81 Similarly, the driver-claimants were paid
based on a "per trip basis."' 82 The "per trip basis" payment by
Uber was similar to FedEx's because an Uber driver's trips include delivering passengers, making stops to pick up and drop off
passengers, and the distance traveled is factored into the fare.
The FedEx drivers, like the driver-claimants also received
bonuses.1 83 The bonuses were for "drivers who service two or
more routes ... service bonus[es] based on years of service ... a
bonus for meeting certain accuracy goals.., and a group bonus if
all drivers at the terminal meet . . . service goal[s] for the period."' 18 4 Additionally, FedEx paid "$27 to $127 daily to drivers
who service routes where customer density and package volume
are still developing."' 185 Similarly, the driver-claimants could re-

179 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610 (2014), vacated, 849 F.3d
1123 (2017).
180
Id. at 615; The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 5.
181 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610 at 615.
182 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
183 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610 at 615.

184 id.

185 Id.
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ceive a promotional bonus such as "surge pricing," or promotions
1 86
to provide rides in certain areas during a set time period.
The NLRB in FedEx found that this prong of the test favored "employee" status for the FedEx drivers because "FedEx
'establishes, regulates, and controls the rate of compensation and
financial assistance to the drivers as well as the rates charged to
customers.' ' 187 Similarly, Uber "establishes, regulates, and controls the rate of compensation" for the driver-claimants and provided "financial assistance,"'1 88 by giving the driver-claimants ac18 9
cess to loans they would not have otherwise received.
Additionally, Uber
sets the rates charged to customers, the Uber
190
driver does not.
One factor that is present in FedEx's compensation
scheme, and not Uber's, is an "insulat[ion] ...against loss," and a
"guarantee[d] an income level predetermined by FedEx."1 91 FedEx paid drivers for "simply . . . showing up on contractuallymandated days," subsidized drivers delivering to "emerging
routes," compensated drivers if FedEx caused a reduction of deliveries on a driver's route, and provided a "fuel/mileage subsidy if
gasoline prices increase[d] substantially. ' 92 Essentially, FedEx
paid its drivers a weekly salary thorough this insulation from any
loss.
Uber's compensation scheme does not "insulate" drivers
from loss or "guarantee an income." Uber compensates drivers
"on a per trip basis." 193 Uber does provide its drivers with incentive programs like surge pricing, but it does not "guarantee an income" by simply logging into the App. Uber does, within its own
discretion, provide drivers with a "wait fee" or a "cancellation fee"
for drivers who accept rides that are ultimately cancelled by the
186 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
187 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610, 623 (2014) (quoting Roadway I1, 326 NLRB 851).
18 8

id.
189
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
190 Id.
191 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 623.
192id.

193 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
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passenger prior to pick-up or the passenger fails to meet the driver
within the ten-minute wait period. 194 Unlike FedEx, Uber did not
essentially provide drivers with a weekly salary, but had some insulation-from-loss provisions like FedEx.
Because of the similar pay structure between the employee
FedEx drivers and the driver-claimants, this Note argues that this
factor leans in favor of employee status, even if Uber did not proor guarantee some compensation like
vide insulation-from-loss
1 95
FedEx
2. Party Like its 1099
The driver-claimants did not receive W2s, 196 but instead
were provided with an "IRS Form 1099 to report . . . fare-based
income to the Internal Revenue Service."' 97 The 1099 form
("1099") is "used to report payments to independent contractors." 198 Unter also provided the claimants with "Form 1099 Misbase earnings, such as incentive and
cellaneous to report non-fare
1' 99
promotion payments."
The 1099 appears in most of the relevant case law on this
subject matter. The claimants in Bynog were not employees of the
principal-defendant because, inter alia, the waiters received a
1099 from the agent-company. 20 In Saleem v. Corp. Transp.
194

195

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 17.
See DriverPay, New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission,

https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/driver-pay.page (last visited April 23,
2019) (explaining The NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission adopted rules that
establish "a minimum amount the largest [For-Hire Vehicle] companies must
pay drivers for each trip," but the rules do not "establish a minimum wage").
196 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11; Find-ARide: A listing of TLC Licensed Bases by Borough and by Zip Code, N.Y.C.
TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION,

http:/ihome2.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/fmd-a-ride.pdf (last updated on
July 26, 2017).
197 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
198 See McGillis v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 226 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
199 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
200 Bynog v. Cipriani Grp., Inc., 802 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (2003).
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Group, Ltd., the drivers received 1099s, and the court ruled that
the plaintiff black-car drivers, 20 1 were in-fact and in-law "independent contractors. '" 202 In addition, the Saleem black-car drivers
also did not receive benefits, like the driver-claimants. 203 'While
Saleem is a Second Circuit case, and thus is not binding on New
York State courts, the fact that the black-car drivers are within the
same industry as the driver-claimants in the same city, may be persuasive.
This factor, whether the drivers were on Uber's payroll,
was determined by A.L.J. Michelle Burrowes to be in favor of the
employee classification of the driver-claimants,20 4 and thus the
court will most likely find that the ruling is correct. 205 Nonetheless the Saleem facts may sway the court to determine that this
prong leans in favor of an independent contractor classification.
E. Whether the Worker was on a Fixed Schedule
"Uber does not impose a work schedule on the drivers, 20 6
and the drivers are free to choose "when, where and how long they
will work" when using the Uber App. 207 Drivers do not have to
request time off from Uber, but one claimant's contract stated that
he must accept ride requests on the Uber App "at least once per

201

Compare 35 R.C.N.Y. § 59A-01(a) (defining For-Hire vehicles as

"Liveries," "Black Cars," and "Limousines") and 35 R.C.N.Y. §59A-03(b), (c)
(explaining all black cars belong to a base that dispatches vehicles on a "prearrangedbasis" (emphasis added)), with 35 R.C.N.Y. §51-03 ("Taxicab means
a motor vehicle, yellow in color, bearing a Medallion indicting that it is licensed
by the Commission to carry up to five passengers for hire and authorizedto accept hails" (emphasis added)).
202 See Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp. Ltd., 854 F.3d 131,
140, 141 n.22
(2d Cir. 2017).
203 Id. at 141 n.22; The Unemployment Insurance Case,
supra note 11, at
5.
204 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11.
205 In re Concourse Ophthalmology Assocs., P.C., 456 N.E.2d 1201
(1983).
206 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 7.
207 Id.; Hamilton, supra note 7.
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month., 20 8 A.L.J. Burrowes conceded that this freedom in work
schedule, along with the driver's ability to "select[] their works areas;" take leave without Uber's permission, and the lack of fringe
all factors indicative of an independent contractor
benefits20 [were]
9
status."
F.

BYNOG SCORECARD

The Bynog factor test attempts to determine "the degree of
control exercised by the purported employer over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results. '2 10 Based on the
analysis above, the "score" is one point for an employee classification, i.e. whether the worker works at his own convenience. 21I
The independent contractor classification "score" is three, i.e.
whether the worker can have other employment, whether the
worker received fringe benefits, and whether the work had a fixed
schedule. 2 12 The "payroll" factor is undetermined by the 2analysis
3
because compelling evidence supports each determination. 1
Even though A.L.J. Burrowes acknowledged that those
three factors were "indicative of an independent contractor status, '214 she still determined that the driver-claimants were employees for unemployment benefits purposes, 2 15 and the Appeal
Board affirmed this decision.2 16 The A.L.J. placed significant
weight on the facts included in the analysis of the "convenience"
factor in the Bynog test.217 A.L.J. Burrowes found "the overriding
evidence establishes that Uber exercised sufficient supervision, direction, and control over key aspects of the services rendered by

208

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 7.

2

09Id.

210
211

at 15.

Bynog v. Cipriani Grp., Inc., 802 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (2003).
See supra Part WV.A.

212

See supra Part IV.B, C, E.

213

See supra Part IV.D.

214

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 15.

215

Id. at 19.

216

The Board Decision, supra note 16.

217 id.
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claimants
such that an employer-employee relationship was creat2 18
ed.
Because there is "substantial evidence" to support the
A.L.J. and Board's conclusion that Uber exerted enough control
over the driver-claimants to form an employer-employee relationship, and because the legal presumption of correctness pursuant to
Concourse Ophthalmology weighs so heavily in favor of the prior
Administrative decision, the court hearing Uber's appeal will most
likely affirm. 219
V. EFFECTS OF A POTENTIAL APPEAL
A. If Uber Loses the Appeal

Because the A.L.J. extended the employment classification
to "all others similarly situated to [the] claimants ...

as of January

1, 2014, ' ' 220

Uber may be on the hook for unemployment benefits
to substantially more former drivers than just the three driverclaimants. 221 This could mean non-stop litigation for Uber when
these "similarly situated" former drivers start presenting their
claims for unemployment benefits. These potential claims mean
that Uber will be expending substantial resources not only fighting
every claim, but also providing unemployment benefits to the successful claimants.2 2 2 Discovery-related demands will also cost
Uber because it will have to dig up records on the potential claimants, which date back to before January 24, 2014, more than four
years ago at minimum.
Furthermore, the precedent this case sets could be used to
determine that all Uber drivers in New York/New York City are
employees. If so, Uber would then be required to provide minimum wage, overtime, and other statutory benefits guaranteed to

218

The Board Decision, supra note 16.

219

In re Concourse Ophthalmology, 456 N.E.2d at 1201; The Unem-

ployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 15.
220 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 19.
221 See id.
222 See id.
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employees. This is a destination that Uber does not want to be
dropped off at and certainly will mean that Uber will give the
judge a one-star rating.
B. If Uber Wins the Appeal
1. Beating the Case and Doing the Race223
McGillis
In McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity, a
former Uber driver in Florida was determined not to be an "employee" for the purpose of reemployment assistance.2 24 In other
words, not only is the McGillis plaintiff not an employee for the
purpose of reemployment assistance, but no Uber driver in the
225
State of Florida is eligible for reemployment assistance.
In order to determine the employment relationship status,
Florida courts follow the factors listed in Section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.226 These factors are similar to
those discussed in Morton and later refined in Bynog.227 After applying these factors, the court in McGillis "agree[d] with the Department's conclusion that Uber drivers like McGillis are not employees for purposes of reemployment assistance., 228 The court
also held that the contract between the drivers and Uber "unequivocally disclaim[ed] an employer-employee relationship[]-[and] the
parties' actual practice reflect[ed] the written contract., 229 After
applying the factors to the case at hand and analyzing the amount

223

See TAY-K, The Race, on SANTANA WORLD (88 Classic, RCA Records

and Sony Music 2017) (explicit content warning).
224 McGillis v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017).
225

See id.

226

See id. at 224; see also supra note 62 (outlining the nine factors pro-

vided in Section 220 of the Restatement (First) of Agency).
227 Compare supra note 62 (listing the nine factors provided in Section
220 of the Restatement (First) of Agency), with supra text accompanying notes
75-76 (stating the five factors outlined in the Bynog decision).
228 See McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 225.
229 id.
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of autonomy granted to its employees, the court first noted that the
drivers "suppl[ied] their own vehicles-the most essential equipment for the work-and control whether, when, where, with whom,
and how to accept and perform trip requests. 2 30 Furthermore,
drivers worked at "their own discretion," and Uber did not provide
"direct supervision. ' ' 23 1 Uber also "did not prohibit drivers from
working for its direct competitors., 23 2 Notably, Uber provided its
drivers with the 1099 IRS tax form, a form reserved for independent contractors, and Uber did not provide fringe benefits. 233 The
court did not find the fact that "Uber may deactivate a driver's account under certain *circumstances" to be dispositive, but instead
decided the Uber driver requesting relief was more akin to an independent contractor than to an employee and therefore, he was
234
not entitled to receive reemployment assistance benefits.
2.

What Does McGillis Mean for the Driver-Claimants
and the "Similarly-Situated"Drivers?

If these facts sound familiar, it is because they are. A.L.J.
Michelle Burrowes considered identical facts in her determination
and came to the opposite conclusion, which was affirmed by the
Appeal Board. 235 The actual question is how "similarly-situated"
the relevant courts are.
While McGillis has no precedential value on a New York
State court, Uber will almost certainly introduce it as persuasive
evidence. Using the standard of review articulated in the Concourse Ophthalmology decision,2 3 6 Uber could attempt to get
A.L.J. Burrowes' determination overruled by arguing that her de-

230

23 1

See McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 225-26.
Id. at 226.

232 Id.
233 Id.
234

See id.

235

The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11; The Board Deci-

sion, supra note 16.
236 In re Concourse Ophthalmology Assoc., P.C.,
456 N.E.2d
1201, 1201 (1983).
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237 The alcision was not "supported by substantial evidence.
most-identical case found in McGillis could be used to show that
the determinative facts do not support her conclusion. The major
difference between McGillis and the driver-claimants is that in
McGillis, the Department of Economic Opportunity found in favor
238
of Uber before the case was appealed to a state court.
Similar to the Concourse Ophthalmology's standard of review, the controlling standard of review in McGillis required the
court to give "great deference" to the Department of Economic
Opportunit 's "interpretation of [the] statute it is charged with enforcing., 23V Unlike the McGillis plaintiff, the administrative adjudicative process found in favor of the driver-claimants, thus Uber
is walking into the batter's box with two strikes in New York,
whereas it started with a runner on third in Florida.

3.

Uber May Have an Ace Up Its Saleem

In Saleem v. Corporate Transportation Group, Ltd., the
Second Circuit held the claimant-black car drivers, a service simi0
lar to Uber, were not "employees." 24 On the surface, the service
provided by the Corporate Transportation Group ("CTG") black
car drivers was similar to the Uber driver-claimants in the Unemployment Insurance Case, 241 Saleem shows that even seemingly
237

See In re Concourse Ophthalmology Assoc., P.C., 456 N.E.2d 1201,

1201 (1983).
238 McGillis v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 222-23 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
2 39
1 1d. at 224 n.6.
240 Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 149 (2d Cir. 2017).
241 Compare N.Y.C. Admin. Code 19-502(u) ("Black Car" means a forhire vehicle dispatched from a central facility whose owner holds a franchise
from the corporation or other business entity which operates such central facility, or who is a member of a cooperative that operates such central facility,
where such central facility has certified to the satisfaction of the commission
that more than ninety percent of the central facility's for-hire business is on a
payment basis other than direct cash payment by a passenger), with N.Y.C.
Admin. Code 19-502(g) ("'For-hire vehicle' means a motor vehicle carrying
passengers for hire in the city, with a seating capacity of twenty passengers or
less, not including the driver, other than a taxicab, coach, wheelchair accessible
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"similarly situated" drivers may not as similar once further analyzed.
One major difference between Saleem and the Unemployment Insurance Case is that the statute which the case arose under
was the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), has as decidedly different intention than the New York State Unemployment
Insurance Law.242 Further, the test used by the Saleem court to determine the black car drivers' employment status was the "economic reality test" as articulated by U.S. v. Silk and adopted by the
Second Circuit in Brock v. Superior Care, Inc.24 3 Besides the differences in the tests applied, 244 the actual employment of the

van, commuter van or an authorized bus operating pursuant to applicable provisions of law."). New York City classifies Uber and Lyft as For-Hire Vehicles.
For-Hire Vehicle TransportationStudy, Office of the Mayor (Jan. 2016),
https://wwwl .nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/For-Hire-VehicleTransportation-Study.pdf.
242 Id. at 135, 138. The Second Circuit did
not hear the New York Labor
Laws claim on appeal. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (1938). The stated policy behind the FLSA is to eliminate adverse working
conditions while the Unemployment Insurance Law stated policy is to maintain
an unemployment fund for qualified workers fired due to no fault of their own.
Id. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1938), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 501 (McKinney
1944).
243 Saleem, 854 F.3d at 140 (first citing Brock
v. Superior Care, Inc., 840
F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1988); then citing U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716
(1947)).
244 CompareSilk, 331
U.S. at 716,
(1)the degree of control exercised by the employer over the
workers, (2) the workers' opportunity for profit or loss and
their investment in the business, (3) the degree of skill and independent initiative required to perform the work, (4) the
permanence or duration of the working relationship, and (5)
the extent to which the work is an integral part of the employer's business.
with Bynog v. Cipriani Grp., 802 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (2003) ("(1) worked at his
own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other employment, (3) received
fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer's payroll and (5) was on a fixed schedule."). The Economic Realities Test focuses its analysis on the worker and
whether the work is self-reliant and in essence is running his/her own business,
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Saleem drivers and the Uber driver-claimants differed to a such a
degree that Saleem would most likely not be persuasive on a New
York State court hearing the Unemployment Insurance Case on
appeal.
The work conducted by the Saleem drivers and the Uber
driver-claimants was similar in the sense that each driver picked
up passengers and brought them to their destination. Additionally,
Latyth
245
Lastly, the
both sets of drivers could work for competitors.
But the
drivers in both cases did not have to set a schedule.
similarities in their employment ends there.
First, the Saleem drivers had a significantly higher financial investment into their own business. The Saleem drivers were
franchisees of CTG and becoming so required a "substantial fi"
nancial outlay" of "between $68,838 and $89,038. 247 In addition
to high capital investment, Saleem drivers had a greater degree in
negotiating their contracts with CTG, showcased by "wide varia24 8
The Uber
tion" in terms that each franchisee-driver agreed to.
driver-claimants had no such franchise agreement nor "substantial
the Uber driver-claimants entered into
financial outlay," instead
"adhesion contracts., 249 Further, the Saleem drivers were responsible for "vehicle acquisition, fuel, repair, and maintenance, license, registration and insurance fees, and tolls, parking, and tickets," and were not reimbursed by CTG. 250 The Uber driverclaimants had similar expenses but Uber charged the passengers
for tolls and Uber, within its own discretion, reimbursed drivers
251
for vehicle damage caused by passengers and tickets.

while the Degree of Control test focuses on the employer and how much control
he/she wields over the worker.
245 Saleem, 854 F.3d at 141; The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra
note 11, at 19.
246 Saleem, 854 F.3d at 146; The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra
note 11, at 7.
247 Saleem, 854 F.3d at 144-45.
248
Id. at 141.
249 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 15.
250 See Saleem, 854 F.3d at 145.
251 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11-13.
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Second, while both the Saleem drivers and the Uber driverclaimants did not have to set a schedule with CTG or Uber respectively,252 Uber provided financial benefit and hardship for drivers
who did or did not work when Uber wanted them to. CTG did not
provide an "incentive structure for [drivers] to drive at certain
times, on particular days of in specific locations., 253 When Uber
demand was high, Uber would provide "surge" pricing to incentivizing the drivers to provide service when Uber needed the help.254
Further, Uber provided promotional monies for driving at certain
times, and specific places, serving as an example was Uber attempting to control where and when drivers worked.2 5 5 Additionally, Uber would punish drivers with termination/deactivation for
rejecting or cancelling rides, i.e. for not working when Uber wanted.2 56 On the other hand, Saleem drivers had sole discretion in accepting and declining rides, exemplified by one driver "reject[ing]
949 job offers" in a three-year span, without any consequences.
It is clear that the "type" of employment was different between the Saleem and Uber driver-claimants. The Saleem drivers
were, in fact, running their own business that had access to CTG
resources, but were subjected to CTG rates when providing service
for CTG. 25 8 The Uber driver-claimants had no financial stake in
Uber, were at the whims of Uber's deactivation policy, depended
on Uber to cover some necessary expenses, and most importantly,
Uber directed drivers when and where to provide services by incentivizing drivers. The facts of cases are distinguishable. Thus,
Saleem would not be persuasive because it is contemplating employment classification under a federal law distinguishable from

252

Saleem, 854 F.3d at 146; The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra

note 11, at 7.
253 Saleem, 854 F.3d at 146; The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra
note 11, at 7.
254 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 11; How surge
pricingworks, supra note 103.
255 The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 7.
256 Id. at 8-9.
257 See Saleem, 854 F.3d at 147.
258 Id. at 136-37.
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the case at hand and the facts simply suggest that the drivers were
different.
4. What McGillis and Saleem Meanfor the DriverClaimants
The similarities and outcomes of McGillis and Saleem are
damning for the driver-claimants. But there is a silver-lining.
Neither McGillis nor Saleem are binding on a New York State
court. However persuasive these cases may be, a New York State
court does not have to consider the rational of those decisions.
Uber may be best-served by using the arguments that persuaded
those courts to decide in their favor. Luckily for the driverclaimants, they most likely will not have to withstand McGillis/Saleem attacks to heart of their labor misclassification claims,
thanks to the Concourse Ophthalmology decision.
VI. IF UBER DECIDES TO SETTLE INSTEAD OF

APPEAL

A. The Terminatorvs. Sarah O'Connor
O'Connorv. Uber Technologies, Inc., is a class action lawsuit currently being argued in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California in the Ninth Circuit. 25 9 Like the
driver-claimants in New York, the O'Connor plaintiffs alleged
"that Uber misclassifies drivers as independent contractors rather
than employees., 260 The O'Connorplaintiffs have further alleged
that as a result of the misclassification, Uber's drivers lose employment entitlements such as "reimburse[ment] for expenses such
as gas and use of their vehicle, 261 and that Uber was "failing to

259

O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal.

2016).
26°Id.at 1113.
261 Id.
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remit the full gratuity to drivers as required by-California Labor
[Laws]."262
Similarly to their defense in the driver-claimants' case, Uber "argued that because it exercises minimal control over how
drivers set their own hours and work schedule, its drivers cannot
be considered employees. 263 The O'Connor plaintiffs "contend
that Uber in fact exercised considerable control and supervision
over the methods and means of its drivers' provision of transportation services, making drivers employees."2 Identical contentions
regarding Uber's control was the determinative factor for A.L.J.
Michelle Burrowes' decision to classify the New York driver265
claimants as employees.
During the course of litigation in O'Connor,the plaintiffs'
class size increased to more than 240,000 drivers. 266 The court
"concluded that the ultimate determination of employment status
had to be decided by a jury because there were disputes over material questions of fact, such as whether Uber has the right to significantly control the 'manners and means' of drivers' transportation
services.',267 However, before the trial began, the plaintiffs accepted a settlement offer of $84 million from Uber.268 In exchange for the payments and other changes Uber agreed to make
regarding policy, 2 69 it "require[d] settlement class members ... to
release all claims based on or reasonably related to the employ270
ment misclassification claim."
Although the parties were able to reach a consensus, the
Settlement Agreement still had to be approved by the court to
262
263

15.

O'Connor,201 F. Supp. 3d at 1113.
Id. at 1114; see The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at

O'Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1114.
The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 19.
266 O'Connor, 201 F.Supp. 3d at 1115.
267 Id.at 1114.
268 Id. at 1116-17 (explaining that per the terms of the settlement, the
264

265

drivers represented would be paid, on average, $10-$1,950, based on the mileage that the driver drove for Uber).
261 Id.at 1117-19.
270

Id. at 1119.
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comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 271 The court
ultimately rejected the Settlement Agreement, and one reason it
gave for its decision was that the $84 million settlement was essentially "a 90% discount off the verdict value. 272 In the Settlement Agreement, $1 million of the $84 million was to be ear("PAGA")
marked for the Private Attorneys General Act
273
The PAGA claim in O'Connor involved the invalidaclaims.
tion of Uber's arbitration clauses, which was a point of contention
in this litigation, and partly served to shape the class size.2 74 The
Plaintiffs counsel "argued that the PAGA claim could result in
penalties over $1 billion."275 Because the "[p]laintiffs propose settling the PAGA claim for 0.1% of its estimated full worth,' 276 and
due to the "relatively modest settlement of the non-PAGA

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified
class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed or compromised only with the
court's approval.").
272 O'Connor,201 F. Supp. 3d at 1129.
271

Id. at 1128, 1132-33 ("By creating a cause of action under which pri-

273

vate plaintiffs may recover civil penalties otherwise recoverable by the state,
PAGA benefits the public by augmenting the state's enforcement capabilities,
encouraging compliance with Labor Code provisions, and deterring noncompliance.").
274 Id.

at 1115.

After further briefing on this matter and oral arguments, the
Court certified the following subclass of drivers: All UberBlack, UberX, and UberSUV drivers who have driven for
Uber in the state of California at any time since August 16,
2009, and meet all the following requirements: (1) who signed
up to drive directly with Uber or an Uber subsidiary under
their individual name, and (2) are/were paid by Uber or an
Uber subsidiary directly and in their individual name, and (3)
electronically accepted any contract with Uber or one of Uber's subsidiaries which contain the notice and opt-out provisions previously ordered by this Court, and did not timely opt
out of that contract's arbitration agreement.
Id.
271

Id. at 1133.

276 id.
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claims, 277 the court reasoned, "the settlement as a whole as currently structured is not fair, adequate and reasonable.278 Essentially, the settlement attempt in O'Connor failed due to Uber's
strategy of low-balling, but Plaintiffs counsel shares some blame
for accepting those terms.
B. The Priceof Settling
In January 2018, "Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Maren Nelson, approved a settlement agreement between Uber and a
class of California Uber drivers.' 279 Similar to the driverclaimants and the O'Connor plaintiffs, lead plaintiff Price claimed
that Uber "misclassifies drivers as independent contractors instead
of employees., 280 Like the O'Connor settlement, the initial settlement agreement in Price was rejected by the court. 2 1 The initial settlement would have only provided the drivers within the
class with "roughly $1 each., 282 A year after the initial settlement's rejection, a nearly identical settlement was approved by the

277

O'Connor,201 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.

Id. (emphasis added).
279 Price v. Uber Techs. Inc., Case No. BC554512 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los An278

geles Cty 2015); Tait, supra note 31 (citing Melissa Daniels, Calif Judge OKs
$7. 75M UberDriverDeal Over Objections, LAw360 (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:25 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1002461/calif-judge-oks-7-75m-uber-driverdeal-over-objections).
28
0 Id. (quoting Melissa Daniels, Calif.Judge OKs $7. 75M Uber Driver
Deal Over Objections, LAw360 (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:25 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1 002461/calif-judge-oks-7-75m-uber-driverdeal-over-objections).
281 Id. (citing Daniel Siegal, Judge Refuses To OK
Uber's Unpopular
$8MPAGA Deal, LAW360 (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:12 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/900785/judge-refuses-to-ok-uber-sunpopular-8m-paga-deal).
282
Id. (quoting Daniel Siegal, Judge Refuses To OK Uber's Unpopular
$8MPAGA Deal, LAw360 (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:12 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/900785/judge-refuses-to-ok-uber-sunpopular-8m-paga-deal).
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court.283 The Honorable Judge Nelson, the same judge that rejected the initial settlement, described the second settlement agreement as "'fair and reasonable' under the circumstances. 284 Seemingly, over the course of a year, the $1 offer to each driver became
"fair and reasonable. 285
C. The Difference Between O'Connor and Price
Settlements
Seemingly the only difference between the O'Connor and
Price settlements is the amount that the State of California will receive under the respective PAGA claims. The O'Connor settlement was rejected, inter alia, because "[p]laintiffs propose[d] settling the PAGA claim for 0.1% of its estimated full worth," of $1
billion. 2 86 InPrice, "at least $2.9 million" of the "$7.75 million"
settlement agreement was earmarked for the State. 287 Other than
that one fact, the claims and settlements are similar.
D. Applying O'Connor & Price to the "Similarly
Situated" Drivers
In applying the lessons learned from O'Connor and Price
to the New York drivers "similarly situated" to the driverclaimants, Uber could reach a settlement with these drivers with
much less difficulty than it had in California.
One major difference between the O'Connor case and the
driver-claimants' case is the magnitude of the classes. O'Connor
was a class action suit that involved 240,000 drivers, and poten283

Id. (citing Melissa Daniels, Calif.Judge OKs $7. 75M Uber Driver

Deal Over Objections, LAw360 (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:25 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1002461/calif-judge-oks-7-75m-uber-driverdeal-over-objections).
2 84
id.

285

See id.

286

O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1133 (N.D. Cal.

2016) (noting that a $1 billion maximum penalty was estimated by the Labor
and Workforce Development Agency).
287

Tait, supra note 31.
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tially more if the PAGA claim had been successfully litigated by
the plaintiffs.288 As of March 2019, New York State does not have
a statute similar to the PAGA.289 The New York driver-claimants
sued as three individuals and only sought judgment on their collective case. The potential of the unknown amount of "similarly situated" drivers is a product of the A.L.J. extending the judgment to
"similarly situated" drivers.29 °
Another major difference is the complexity of the claims.
The New York driver-claimants were seeking unemployment benefits. 291 The O'Connor and Price plaintiffs were seeking to be
classified as employees and receive all the benefits and protections
that California law has to offer for employees, including reimbursement for expenses, miles traveled, wear and tear of their ve292
hicle, and the right to their tips.
Meanwhile, the weekly "maximum benefit rate" of Unemployment Insurance in New York State is currently $450.293
Whereas the O 'Connor class plaintiffs could have received as little
as ten dollars,294 and the Price plaintiffs could have received
"roughly $1 each,, 295 similarly situated New York plaintiffs are
looking to receive much greater sums in this litigation. Decisions
See O'Connor,201 F. Supp. 3d at 1115 (deciding that 240,000 drivers
were certified into the class action but noting that "a waiver of PAGA claims
was void as a matter of public policy" and thus, "this PAGA waiver could not
be severed from the remainder of the arbitration agreement, rendering the entire
arbitration agreement void").
289 See Josh Eidelson, CaliforniaHelps Workers
Sue Their Bosses. New
York Has Noticed, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Sept. 29, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-29/california-helpsworkers-sue-their-bosses-new-york-has-noticed (stating that New York City's
public advocate's office was considering campaigning for a "PAGA-like" bill).
290 See The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra note 11, at 19.
291 See id. at 3, 19.
292 See O'Connor,201 F.Supp. 3d at 1113-14, 1117, 1124, 1128; Tait,
288

supra note 31.
293 New York State Department of Labor, How Your Weekly
Unemployment Insurance Benefit Payment is Calculated,LABOR.NY.GOV (Sept. 2018),
https://labor.ny.gov/formsdocs/factsheets/pdfs/p832.pdf.
294 See O'Connor,201 F.Supp. 3d at 1117.
295 Tait, supra note 31.
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in other states can serve to illustrate how costly these "similarly
situated" drivers could be to Uber, if Uber is not successful in settling here in New York.29 6
VII. CONCLUSION

Based on A.L.J. Michelle Burrowes' decision in the Unemployment Insurance Case and Concourse Ophthalmology, there
is "substantial evidence" to determine that the driver-claimants are
"employees" for unemployment benefits purposes. Because of the
highly deferential standard of review required by Concourse Ophthalmology,297 a New York State court will most likely uphold the
A.L.J.'s determination. While the Bynog "scorecard" leans in favor of an "independent contractor" classification, the amount of
control Uber held over the driver-claimants in the "convenience"
analysis substantially outweighs the lack of the control Uber held
over the driver's schedule, outside employment opportunities, and
their fringe benefits. 298 Cases such as Saleem and McGillis could
be damaging to the driver-claimants and the "similarly situated"
drivers, but luckily those cases are not binding on a New York
State court. A New York State court will most likely affirm A.L.J.
Michelle Burrowes' determination.
Thus, Uber's "go-to" move in this scenario is to offer settlements to the driver-claimants and the "similar situated" drivers.
As shown by Price, this strategy can and does work, even if the
O'Connor settlement failed.2 99 While Uber does have persuasive,
but not binding, case law on its side in McGillis and Saleem, the
price could literally be too high to risk litigating this labor misclassification suit. All it takes is one loss in a New York State
See Griswold, supra note 18.
297 In re Concourse Ophthalmology Assocs., P.C., 456 N.E.2d 1201, 1201
296

(1983).
298

See supra text accompanying notes 75-76 (outlining the five factors

used in the Bynog decision), with The Unemployment Insurance Case, supra
note 11, at 16-17 (listing the means of control that Uber exercises over its drivers in regard to timing and freedom to turn down rides).
299 See O'Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., F. Supp. 3d 1110, 119 n.6, 1125
n.10, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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court to upend Uber's independent contractor business model.
With tens of thousands current and former Uber drivers in New
York State, any adverse court decision for Uber on the labor classification front could break the bank. Uber would be best served
by offering a settlement to the driver-claimants like the Price settlement and stipulate that driver-claimants dismiss their labor misclassification claims. By doing so, there will be no precedent in
New York State that declares that Uber drivers are "employees" in
any capacity. As seen in the countless Uber labor misclassification cases, Uber's ultimate goal is to maintain the status quo of its
drivers as "independent contractors", and Uber has been willing to
shell out millions of dollars to keep the courts from interfering
with its business model. Based on the evidence provided, this
Note concludes that Uber will have the drive-claimants driving
straight to the bank with settlement money.
Alexander M Tait*
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